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22nd Time’s the Charm: The 2015 Revisions to 
Summary Judgment in Louisiana 
INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception, the motion for summary judgment has progressed 
from rarely utilized to a commonplace procedural occurrence.1 In 2015 
alone, Louisiana appellate courts decided well over 400 appeals 
concerning motions for summary judgment.2 In 2014, the number of 
appeals reached more than 500.3 This number stands in stark contrast to 
the six summary judgment appeals heard in 1996 and the 14 summary 
judgment appeals heard in 1997.4 As cases continue to grow in size and 
complexity, summary judgment and related appeals will likely maintain 
this commonplace status and may occur even more frequently. 
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966 governs motions for 
summary judgment in Louisiana state courts.5 As the frequency and 
complexity of motions for summary judgment increased over time,6 the 
Louisiana legislature attempted to keep the article, and the motion practice 
it governs, in line with the current needs of litigation. As a result, Article 
966 has undergone repeated revisions.7 Yet another attempt at updating 
Article 966 took place in 2015, when the Louisiana legislature, in 
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 1. Brooke D. Coleman, Summary Judgment: What We Think We Know v. 
What We Ought to Know, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 705, 708–09 (2012); see, e.g., infra 
notes 2–4. 
 2. This number is based on a LexisNexis search of summary judgment cases, 
limited to cases heard by Louisiana appellate courts between January 1, 2015 and 
December 31, 2015. This search does not include cases that were disposed of on 
summary judgment at the trial court level that were not appealed.  
 3. This number is based on a LexisNexis search of summary judgment cases, 
limited to cases heard by Louisiana appellate courts between January 1, 2014 and 
December 31, 2014. This search does not include cases that were disposed of on 
summary judgment at the trial court level that were not appealed.  
 4. These numbers are based on a LexisNexis search of summary judgment 
cases heard between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 1996 and January 1, 1997 
and December 31, 1997, respectively. This search does not include cases that were 
disposed of on summary judgment at the trial court level that were not appealed. 
 5. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (2016). 
 6. See supra notes 1–4. 
 7. See, e.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (1996); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 
966 (1997); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (1998); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 
(1999); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (2000); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 
(2001). The preceding list contains only some of the prior versions of Article 966. 
All archived versions of the code article are available on WestLaw or LexisNexis. 
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conjunction with the Louisiana Law Institute (the “Law Institute”), 
comprehensively rewrote Article 966.8 The 2015 revisions were intended 
to reconstruct the article9 and included changes to the layout and language 
of the article in general, the deadlines for timing and briefing, the required 
evidentiary procedure, the effects of partial motions for summary 
judgment, and the process for appealing trial court rulings on motions for 
summary judgment.10 This Comment argues that the 2015 revisions to 
Article 966 successfully remedied the practical problems that existed in 
the article. However, a few concerns still remain—namely problems with 
delay and increasing complexity of the summary judgment process—and 
care should be taken to ensure that these problems do not undermine the 
changes that were made by the revisions. 
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of summary 
judgment, the process for making the motion, and the history of the 
procedure in both federal and Louisiana state courts. Part II discusses the 
revisions made to Article 966 during the 2015 legislative session, focusing 
in particular on the changes to the timing and briefing deadlines, the 
required evidentiary procedure, the effects of partial summary judgment, 
and the changes to the appeals process. Part III analyzes the practical 
effects of the 2015 revisions on summary judgment procedure. Finally, 
Part IV addresses some remaining concerns and urges Louisiana courts 
and practitioners to make motions for summary judgment an integral part 
of trial preparation, ensuring that the process remains efficient and that the 
changes brought by the 2015 revisions are not undermined by delay. 
I. HOW DID WE GET HERE? THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF SUMMARY JUDGEMENT IN FEDERAL COURTS 
AND LOUISIANA STATE COURTS 
To fully understand the changes brought about by the 2015 revisions 
to Article 966, an understanding of the concept of summary judgment, its 
                                                                                                             
 8. Donald Price, An Update on Proposed Revisions to the Louisiana 
Summary Judgment Statutes, in MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: A REPORT 
TO THE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO ARTICLE 966, at 1 
(2015), http://www.lajudicialcollege.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/3Motions-
for-Summary-Judgment.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2DV-GME9].  
 9. The Legal Ease: Guy Holdridge, Skip Phillips & Donald Price: 6 Things to 
Know about the New MSJ Article at 27:30, LA. L. REV. (November 15, 2015), 
https://soundcloud.com/the-legal-ease/ep-3-hon-guy-holdridge-skip-phillips-donald- 
price-6-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-new-msj-article [https://perma.cc/NW6 
T-P5RG]; see also Price, supra note 8, at 5.  
 10. See infra Part II. 
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purpose, and its functionality is necessary. Additionally, a review of the 
history of federal summary judgment and its influence on the development 
of summary judgment in Louisiana is helpful to illustrate why the 2015 
revisions were necessary and whether the changes were effective. 
A. The Fundamentals of Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is a procedural mechanism by which a party can 
challenge the existence or legal sufficiency of another party’s claim or 
defense and determine the need for a trial.11 This mechanism is intended 
to remedy excessive or unnecessary delay and congestion in courts and 
avoid unnecessary trials by permitting parties to seek final adjudication of 
an action without a full trial.12 On a motion for summary judgment, the 
trial court judge determines, on the basis of the evidence submitted by the 
parties, whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that makes a trial 
necessary.13 A genuine issue of material fact is a dispute over facts of 
consequence to the outcome of the action under the governing law.14 For 
the dispute to be genuine, the evidence must be such that a reasonable jury 
could find in favor of either party.15 Summary judgment is properly 
granted “only when the court determines that the [evidence] in support of 
the motion demonstrate[s] that no genuine issue of material fact exists and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”16 
Conversely, if a genuine issue of material fact does exist, the case is 
suitable for trial and summary judgment must be denied.17  
                                                                                                             
 11. 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2711, at 191 (3d ed. 1998). 
 12. Id. § 2712; WILLIAM SCHWARZER ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE 
ANALYSIS AND DECISION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS: A MONOGRAPH ON 
RULE 56 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 2, 8 (1991) (citing Charles 
E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423 
(1929)). 
 13. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 2711, at 191; see also Ben R. Miller, 
Summary Judgment, 21 LA. L. REV. 209, 210 (1960). 
 14. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); 
Jackson v. City of New Orleans, 144 So. 3d 876, 882 (La. 2014); Phipps v. 
Schupp, 163 So. 3d 212, 224 (La. Ct. App. 2015) (“A genuine issue of material 
fact is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree. . . .”). 
 15. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 
 16. STEVEN R. PLOTKIN & MARY BETH AKIN, 2 LOUISIANA PRACTICE 
SERIES: LOUISIANA CIVIL PROCEDURE 231, 263 (2015); see, e.g., Jackson, 144 
So. 3d at 882; Phipps, 163 So. 3d at 225. 
 17. Miller, supra note 13, at 211. 
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As litigation has increased and modern case management techniques 
have developed, the legal profession has moved away from viewing 
motions for summary judgment merely as a means of disposing of cases 
that are unfit for trial, particularly in more complex litigation.18 Motions 
for summary judgment are now considered a case management tool, and 
they are used in complex litigation to identify and narrow issues for trial 
in order to minimize litigation costs and congestion of court dockets.19 
However, summary judgment was never intended to be a substitute for a 
trial of a case with disputed factual issues.20 The procedure should not be 
used to deprive a party of his right to a full trial when necessary.21 Further, 
because motions for summary judgment can deprive litigants of their right 
to a jury trial and dispose of their cause of action, a court considering a 
motion for summary judgment is required only to determine if genuine 
issues of material fact exist, which would necessitate a trial.22 
B. The History and Development of Summary Judgment in Federal Court 
Summary judgment originated in 19th century England.23 The earliest 
record of a true summary procedure is the 1855 Summary Procedure on 
Bills of Exchange Act, which applied to actions to collect on bills of 
exchange and promissory notes.24 This procedure was later extended to 
other types of claims, usually arising out of bond, statutory penalty, 
guarantee, trust, or landlord-tenant relations.25 At the time, the procedure 
was available only to plaintiffs—usually creditors—allowing them to 
quickly and easily collect debts that could be proven by documentary 
                                                                                                             
 18. See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 12, at 8. 
 19. Id. at 2, 4. See generally Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: 
Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 674−88 (2010) (discussing changes to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that encouraged an increases in judicial case 
management); William W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment and Case Management, 
56 ANTITRUST L.J. 213 (1987) (discussing the use of summary judgment to narrow 
issues and focus discovery in the complex litigation context); see also Steven S. 
Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Managing Summary Judgement, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
517, 518 (2012); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the 
“Litigation Explosion,” “Libaility Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day 
in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1041, 1042 (2008). 
 20. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 2712, at 205 & n.14. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. § 2711. See also SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 12. 
 24. The Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67 
(1855); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 2711, at 191. 
 25. JUDICATURE ACT OF 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 (1873). 
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evidence.26 Much like it is today, the procedure was meant to “reduce delay 
and expense resulting from frivolous defenses.”27 
In the United States, several states enacted summary judgment rules 
similar to those found in England by the late 1800s.28 These statutes were 
similar to the English rule in that summary judgment was limited to plaintiff’s 
claims and to transactions that could be proven using documentary evidence.29 
American courts were initially reluctant to utilize this procedure, viewing it as 
a drastic remedy that should rarely be used.30 This reluctance was largely due 
to widespread concern with preserving parties’ rights, particularly the right 
to a jury trial.31 This concern is one that persists even today.32 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Federal Rules”) were 
adopted in 1938, and they incorporated summary judgment in Rule 56.33 
This new rule was much more progressive than the process previously 
utilized in the states.34 Rule 56 extended the use of motions for summary 
judgment to both plaintiffs and defendants and required a new, increased 
level of proof from the opposing party.35 However, the onerous burden of 
proof imposed on a moving party by the new rule and the overarching 
desire to preserve parties’ right to a jury trial discouraged the use of 
summary judgment even in cases in which it might have been 
                                                                                                             
 26. SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 12. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1940); Avrick 
v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1946); Heyman v. 
Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir. 1975); SCHWARZER 
ET AL., supra note 12, at 3−4. See also US CONST. amend. VII. 
 32. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 
93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007); but see, Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment Is 
Constitutional, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1625 (2008).  
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 34. WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 11, § 2711 (“The applicability and utility of 
the summary-judgment devices was sharply increased by the federal rules.”). 
 35. Previously, parties opposing a summary judgment were permitted to “rest 
on the pleadings” or simply come forward with a sworn statement of the grounds 
for opposition to the motion. At its introduction, Rule 56 required the court to 
consider relevant evidence presented with a motion for summary judgment to 
determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, thus requiring opposing 
parties to introduce their own evidence, rather than merely resting on the 
pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 12, 1−3.  
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appropriate.36 This outlook on motions for summary judgment remained for 
nearly 20 years, until the Supreme Court of the United States handed down 
decisions in three cases: Celotex v. Catrett,37 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc.,38 and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.39 
Collectively, these cases clarified federal summary judgment procedure and 
greatly increased its utility.40 The cases created the foundation for modern 
summary judgment that would later be used as a model by states drafting 
their own summary judgment rules, including Louisiana.41  
Celotex primarily addressed the burdens of proof and production 
required by Rule 56.42 The majority opinion clarified that although the 
moving party initially bears the burden of production—to make a prima 
facie showing that the party is entitled to summary judgment—the burden 
shifts to the other party if the moving party would not bear the burden of 
proof on the issue at trial.43 In that instance, the moving party is merely 
required to show that there is insufficient or no evidence to support the 
non-moving party’s claim.44 Thus, the burden of production shifts to the 
party opposing the motion.45 After Celotex, a moving party who would not 
bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial is no longer required to fully 
negate an opposing party’s claim to prevail on a motion for summary 
judgment.46  
                                                                                                             
 36. The burden of proof imposed on a moving defendant was particularly 
heavy, requiring that a defendant show a genuine issue of material fact by 
disproving an essential element of the plaintiff’s case. Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 
398 U.S. 144, 148 (1970); SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 12, at 6; see, e.g., Poller 
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (later clarified by First Nat’l 
Bank of Ariz. V. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)); S.J. Groves & Sons 
Co. v. Ohio Turnpike Comm’n, 315 F.2d 235, 237 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 
U.S. 824 (1963). 
 37. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 38. 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
 39. 475 U.S. 572 (1986). 
 40. SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 12, at 7. 
 41. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S. 317. 
 43. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 232–33; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 2727. 
 44. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24; Mark Tatum & William Norris, III, Summary 
Judgment and Partial Judgment in Louisiana: The State We’re In, 59 LA. L. REV. 
131, 141 (1998). 
 45. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, at 472. 
 46. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 
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In conjunction with Celotex, Anderson set out a more explicit 
definition for the phrase “genuine issue of material fact.”47 An “issue” was 
defined by the Court as a “dispute[] over facts that might affect the 
outcome of the suit under the governing law.”48 An issue is “genuine” if 
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-
moving party.49 The Anderson holding was subsequently reinforced by 
Matsushita, which required the opposing party to show specifically that a 
genuine issue of material fact exists, rather than merely casting doubt on 
the moving party’s claim.50 Put simply, Celotex made bringing a motion 
for summary judgment easier, while Anderson and Matsushita increased 
the chance that the motion would be granted.51 
Notably, the Court stated in Celotex that summary judgment is not a 
“disfavored procedural shortcut” as many in the profession viewed it.52 
Instead, the Court referred to the procedure as an integral part of the 
Federal Rules, which are intended to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive resolution of every action.53 This acknowledgment, combined 
with the changes made by the Court’s holdings in the Celotex cases, 
signaled the beginning of a shift in judicial and practitioner attitudes 
towards the procedure. After this trilogy of cases, summary judgment 
became the most frequently used legal mechanism for resolving disputes.54 
A study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center found that in the years 
after the Celotex trilogy, courts saw a significant increase in the rate of 
motions for summary judgment filed.55 The rate of summary judgments 
granted doubled, as did the percentage of cases that were terminated by 
motions for summary judgment.56  
                                                                                                             
 47. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 48. Id.; see Jackson v. City of New Orleans, 144 So. 3d 876, 882 (La. 2014). 
 49. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Jackson, 144 So. 3d at 882. 
 50. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–86 
(1986). 
 51. Miller, supra note 18, at 1041; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 
2727, n.24. 
 52. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); see also SCHWARZER ET 
AL., supra note 12, at 3–4; Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 
1940); Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1946); 
Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 53. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 54. Justin J. Boron, Admissibility Tolerance: Limited Latitude for Summary 
Judgment Material Under Rule 56, 56 LOY. L. REV. 221, 233 (2010). 
 55. Coleman, supra note 1, at 708–09.  
 56. Id. (“[T]he rate of summary judgment motion practice in filed cases 
increased from 12% in 1975, to 17% in 1986, and 19% in 1988. The rate of 
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In the years since the Celotex trilogy, the role of summary judgment 
in litigation has continued to expand, arguably overshadowing the role and 
importance of the trial.57 A motion for summary judgment now resembles 
a trial itself, at least with regard to the massive amount of time and 
resources devoted to the motion and the level of technicality and formality 
that the motion now involves.58 Further, courts and practitioners have 
drastically changed their views on what summary judgment is intended to 
achieve.59 Summary judgment is no longer viewed merely as a means to 
eliminate entire suits or defenses to suits deemed to be “frivolous.”60 
Instead, contemporary summary judgment is applied more aggressively 
than any other motion as a case management tool, used to trim individual 
claims and defenses found to be without merit from the main suit.61 
Summary judgment is now often the centerpiece of case resolution in 
federal courts, rather than just an ancillary procedural tool.62  
C. Summary Judgment in Louisiana State Courts 
Twenty-two years after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 
56 were adopted, summary judgment was first introduced in Louisiana 
with the promulgation of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 966 in 
1960.63 Although it was modeled on Rule 56, the original version of 
Article 966 was more limited than the corresponding federal rule. The 
article prohibited motions for summary judgment in certain family law 
matters64 and partial motions for summary judgment,65 suggesting that the 
Louisiana legislature was even more skeptical of summary judgment 
procedure than Congress and the federal courts. An official revision 
comment on the 1960 version of Article 966 indicated that the legislature 
anticipated the motion would not be utilized often, but rather the mere 
existence of the rule would act as a deterrent against bringing frivolous 
                                                                                                             
motions granted in whole or in part increased from 6% in 1975 to 12% in 2000. 
The percentage of cases that summary judgment terminated similarly doubled 
from 4% in 1975 to 8% in 2000.”). 
 57. Boron, supra note 54, at 233. 
 58. Id.; see also EDWARD J. BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 10:2 (3d ed. 2006). 
 59. Boron, supra note 54, at 233. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.  
 63. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (1960); see also Price, supra note 8, at 1. 
 64. LA CODE CIV. PROC. art. 969 (1960); Miller, supra note 13, at 213. 
 65. Miller, supra note 13, at 213 (1960); Price, supra note 8, at 1. 
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demands or defenses.66 Like the federal courts before Celotex, Louisiana 
courts remained skeptical about the summary judgment process for years 
after its introduction and were hesitant to grant the motions, opting instead 
to preserve the party’s right to a jury trial.67 
Louisiana was also slow to adopt changes modernizing summary 
judgment after the Supreme Court’s rulings in Celotex, Anderson, and 
Matsushita. In fact, after the introduction of Article 966 in 1960, no further 
significant revisions were made to the article until 1996, 36 years after the 
article was enacted and ten years after the trilogy.68 In 1996, the Louisiana 
legislature adopted the burden-shifting approach established by the 
Supreme Court in Celotex,69 largely because Article 966 was modeled 
after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56.70 The 1996 revisions also 
included an explicit statement that summary judgment is a preferred means 
for resolving cases, adopting an outlook similar to that espoused by the 
Court in the Celotex trilogy.71  
Unfortunately, the 1996 revisions were not readily accepted by all 
Louisiana courts. The circuits diverged on how much the revisions 
                                                                                                             
 66. LA CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 cmt. a (1960) (“Even though, in all 
probability, it will not be successfully utilized often, the availability of the device 
and its potential for expeditious disposition of frivolous, but well-pleaded, 
demands and defenses should go very far in discouraging such demands and 
defenses.”). Partial summary judgments are those that dispose of a particular 
issue, theory, cause of action, or defense, even if they do not dispose of the entire 
case. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(E) (2015). 
 67. See, e.g., Haas v. Gill, 531 So. 2d 457 (Cole, J., dissenting); Kidder v. 
Anderson, 345 So. 2d 922, 925–26 (La. Ct. App. 1970). 
 68. See 1996 La. Acts 759 (codified at LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (1997)). 
 69. Price, supra note 8, at 2; see also LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art 966 (1997).  
 70. Tatum & Norris, supra note 44, at 136–37 (“When Louisiana adopted the 
Code of Civil Procedure in 1960 . . . the provisions of Article 966 were based 
upon Rule 56(a)-(c) . . . .”). 
 71. “The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action, except those disallowed by Article 
969. The procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends.” 
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (1997). See also CATHERINE PALO, LOUISIANA 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RELATED TERMINATION MOTIONS, § 5:4 (2014 ed.); 
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 321, 327 (1986) (“Summary judgment procedure is 
properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral 
part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy 
and inexpensive determination of every action.”) (internal citations omitted). 
488 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
 
 
 
changed summary judgment procedure in practice.72 For example, the Third 
Circuit found the amendments substantially changed the law of summary 
judgment in Louisiana.73 In Hayes v. Autin, the court reasoned that before 
1996, motions for summary judgment in Louisiana were not favored and 
were to be used only sparingly.74 A jurisprudential presumption against 
granting motions for summary judgment existed, arising out of a desire to 
preserve parties’ rights to a jury trial.75 Because of this presumption, the 
moving party’s evidence was to be strictly scrutinized by the court, and any 
doubt was to be resolved by denying the motion.76 The court found that this 
presumption was legislatively overruled by the 1996 revisions to Article 966 
to bring Louisiana summary judgment more closely in line with the federal 
procedure.77 In fact, the court explicitly adopted the federal courts’ 
determination that summary judgment is not to be disfavored.78  
On the other hand, some circuits did not seem as concerned with the 
effects of the 1996 amendments. In multiple cases, courts merely 
acknowledged that Article 966 had been amended and proceeded to 
analyze the question of law exactly as they would have under the prior 
version of the article.79 On one occasion, the Fourth Circuit was much 
more explicit in its rejection of the potential changes brought by the 1996 
amendments, holding that the amendments were merely a reiteration of the 
current state of the law.80  
                                                                                                             
 72. Compare Hayes v. Autin, 685 So. 2d 691 (La. Ct. App. 1996), with 
Adamson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 676 So. 2d 227 (La. Ct. App. 
1996). 
 73. Hayes, 685 So. 2d at 694. 
 74. Id. at 691. 
 75. Id. at 696 (first citing Sassone v. Elder, 626 So. 2d 345 (La. 1993); and then 
citing Vermillion Corp. v. Vaughn, 397 So. 2d 490 (La. 1981)) (discussing the 
previously existing jurisprudential presumption against granting motions for 
summary judgment and the strict level of scrutiny applied to the motions by courts 
as a result). 
 76. Id. at 694–95.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.; see also Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). 
 79. See, e.g., Adamson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 676 So. 
2d 227, 231 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Dempsey v. Automotive Casualty Ins. Co., 680 
So. 2d 675, 679 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Billingsley v. Mitchel, 676 So. 2d 208, 211 
(La. Ct. App. Cir. 1996), writ denied, 681 So. 2d 1265 (La. 1996).  
 80. See, e.g., Walker v. Kroop, 678 So. 2d 580, 583 (La. Ct. App 1996); 
Stephen Anthony Pitre, The Pelican State Amends Summary Judgment: Recent 
Louisiana Jurisprudence Uncertain About Legislative Intent, 43 LOY. L. REV. 97 
(1998). 
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Considering the vastly different approaches that Louisiana courts of 
appeal took when applying the 1996 amendments, the goals of the 1996 
legislature were clearly not accomplished. As a result, the legislature 
determined that another set of revisions was necessary.81 In 1997, the 
legislature adopted the position taken by the Third Circuit in Hayes v. 
Autin and legislatively overruled any cases that were inconsistent with that 
court’s reasoning, officially bringing Louisiana summary judgment 
procedure more closely in line with the Federal Rules.82 The 1997 
revisions also added the language that would become the foundation for 
the current language of Article 966 governing the burden of proof, 
language largely borrowed from Celotex v. Catrett.83 The amendments 
further provided for partial summary judgments in Louisiana state court—
a mechanism that was already available at the federal level—for the first 
time.84 
D. Frequent Revision, Confusion, and Disorder: The Necessity of More 
Revision to Louisiana’s Summary Judgment Procedure 
After the 1996 and 1997 revisions brought Article 996 closer in line 
with the Federal Rules, Louisiana began experiencing general problems 
arising from the structure of the article. For 20 consecutive years, the 
legislature revised the article to resolve particular problems as they arose.85 
Although this reactionary, piecemeal legislation is a direct way of dealing 
with problems as they develop, it made Article 966 disorganized and 
confusing.86 By the most recent round of revisions, the article no longer 
                                                                                                             
 81. See, e.g., Pitre, supra note 80; David W. Robertson, Summary Judgment 
and Burden of Proof, 45 LA. B.J. 331 (1997). 
 82. Tatum & Norris, supra note 44, at 132; see also 1997 La. Acts 806 
(codified at LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (1998)). 
 83. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(C)(2) (1998) (“The burden of proof remains 
with the movant. However, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial 
on the matter that is before the court on the motion . . . the movant’s burden does 
not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim . . . 
but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for 
one or more [essential] elements.”). 
 84. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(E) (1998) (“A summary judgment may be 
rendered dispositive of a particular issue, theory of recovery, cause of action, or 
defense, in favor of one or more parties, even though the granting of the [motion] 
does not dispose of the entire case.”). 
 85. A LexisNexis or WestLaw search indicates 22 archived versions of 
Article 966, 20 of those revisions or amendments occurred between 1996 and 
2015. 
 86. Price, supra note 8. 
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progressed in a logical or organized manner.87 This disorganization led to 
confusion, as the practical application of the rules varied across 
jurisdictions within the state,88 and the repeated revisions forced courts to 
spend unnecessary time considering the retroactivity of the amendments.89 
A court’s decision regarding the retroactivity of a given change to the 
article was often determinative of the outcome of the motion—or even the 
entire civil action—particularly when evidentiary issues were involved.90 
One court in particular even expressed some apparent frustration with the 
“legislature’s continuous revisions to this ever-changing [article].”91 The 
2015 revisions were undertaken with the goals of rectifying the existing 
confusion and making Article 966 and summary judgment motion practice 
more orderly.92 
In the years leading up to the 2015 revisions, Louisiana was hesitant 
to fully embrace motions for summary judgment and consistently lagged 
behind federal courts when it came to modernizing the procedure.93 
However, Louisiana courts also experience some of the same general 
problems faced by federal courts when dealing with motions for summary 
judgment, such as delay and the complication of the summary judgment 
process. In Louisiana, just as in federal court, summary judgment is no 
longer the quick and efficient process that it was originally intended to be. 
Full trials are fewer now than in the years before the expansion of 
summary judgment, “[b]ut judges confront more summary judgment 
motions, [and] other duties interrupt the time and attention they 
demand.”94 When asked, a majority of attorneys who responded to a 
Federal Judicial Center survey reported that federal judges routinely do 
                                                                                                             
 87. See, e.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (2015). 
 88. The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 27:15. 
 89. See, e.g., First Bank & Trust v. Proctor’s Cove II, L.L.C., 150 So. 3d 418 
(La. Ct. App. 2014); Evans v. Bordelon, 161 So. 3d 674 (La. Ct. App. 2014); 
Marengo v. Harding, 118 So. 3d 1200 (La. Ct. App. 2013). See also infra Part 
II.B.2. 
 90. See, e.g., First Bank & Trust, 150 So. 3d 418; Evans, 161 So. 3d 674; 
Marengo, 118 So. 3d 1200; Mason v. T.M. Boat Rentals, L.L.C., 137 So. 3d 741 
(La. Ct. App. 2014); Woodlands Dev., L.L.C., v. Regions Bank, 164 So. 3d 226 
(La. Ct. App. 2014); Midland Funding v. Urrutia, 131 So. 3d 474 (La. Ct. App. 
2013). See also infra Part II.B.2. 
 91. First Bank & Trust, 150 So. 3d, at 430 (Wicker, J., concurring). 
 92. The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 27:30. 
 93. See supra Part I.C. 
 94. D. Brock Hornby, Summary Judgment Without Illusions, 13 GREEN BAG 
273, 277 (2010). 
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not rule promptly on summary judgment motions.95 Not surprisingly, this 
failure to rule promptly was also cited as a primary cause of delay as suits 
proceed toward trial.96 Little to no data is available regarding the frequency 
of summary judgment filings in Louisiana or the amount of time generally 
spent on them, but the frequency of summary judgment motions in 
Louisiana has drastically increased over the years.97 As a result, it is not 
difficult to see how Louisiana motions for summary judgment—which are 
modeled after the Federal Rules—would experience some of the same 
problems. 
II. STRUCTURE, STYLE, AND SUBSTANCE: THE 2015 REVISIONS 
TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ARTICLE 966 
In response to ongoing concerns regarding summary judgment in 
Louisiana, the Law Institute appointed, at the request of the legislature, a 
subcommittee of lawyers, judges, and law professors to study the procedure.98 
The subcommittee proposed revisions to the Law Institute, which in turn 
recommended revisions to the Louisiana legislature.99 The approved 
revisions, which made both substantive and structural changes to the article, 
were enacted as Act 422 of the 2015 legislative session and took effect on 
January 1, 2016.100 
A. Seeking Logic and Organization: Structural Changes to Article 966 
In its report to the Law Institute, the subcommittee stated that one of 
its primary goals was to address the piecemeal revisions of the past 20 
years and “reorganize [A]rticle 966, so that provisions of the statute that 
address particular issues are set forth in a logical and organized 
                                                                                                             
 95. Id. at 278. The variance in percentage depends on the practice area asked. 
A smaller percentage of plaintiff’s lawyers blames delayed motions rulings for 
delay. Id.  
 96. Id. It is important to note that this response was in reference to all motions 
rulings, not strictly rulings on motions for summary judgment. However, motions 
for summary judgment make up a large part of the motions filed and ruled on. 
 97. “A simple Westlaw search for summary judgment cases by the Louisiana 
Supreme Court returns 576 such cases in the 35 years before the effective date of 
the 1996 amendment, but it returns 581 in the 18 years following the amendment.” 
Price, supra note 8, at 2. See also supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
 98. Price, supra note 8, at 5. 
 99. Id. 
 100. 2015 La. Sess. Law Serv. 876 (West) (codified at LA. CODE CIV. PROC. 
art. 966 (2016)). 
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fashion.”101 Article 966 now begins with a statement of what summary 
judgment is, why it exists, and when the motion may be brought.102 The 
article then sets out timing and briefing requirements.103 The next 
paragraph contains the burden of proof, provisions governing what 
evidence the court may consider, and how evidentiary objections are to be 
raised and resolved.104 Subsequent paragraphs provide for partial summary 
judgment, limit the court’s review to only those issues presented in the 
motion, and set out the effects of grants of summary judgments on 
remaining parties in multi-party litigation.105 The final paragraph contains 
provisions concerning appeals.106 
In addition to organizational changes, the subcommittee also made 
changes that modernized and simplified the language used throughout the 
article. For example, the antiquated and awkward term “movant” was 
replaced with “mover.”107 Additionally, references to “the plaintiff or 
defendant” were replaced with the more general phrase “a party.”108 These 
changes both simplify the rule and make it explicit in the text of the article 
that any party to a case can move for summary judgment. Further, the 
language of Paragraph (G), which deals with the effects of granting a 
partial summary judgment on remaining parties to the suit, was also 
substantially reworked in order to eliminate confusion that existed 
regarding the applicability of the provision and its effect on a case.109 The 
revision to this paragraph also removed unnecessary words and eliminated 
the rule’s confusing exception for affirmative defenses, as well as the 
exceptions to that exception.110 
                                                                                                             
 101. Price, supra note 8, at 5. 
 102. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (A) (2016). 
 103. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(B), (C) (2016). 
 104. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(D) (2016). 
 105. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(E), (G) (2016). 
 106. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(H) (2016). 
 107. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(D)(1) (2016). 
 108. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(A)(1) (2016). 
 109. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (2016). See also discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
 110. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (2016). Previously, Paragraph (G) 
included an exception, stating that the paragraph would not apply when summary 
judgment was granted solely on the basis of a successful assertion of an 
affirmative defense, other than negligence or fault. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 
966(G) (2015).  
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B. Substantive Changes to Summary Judgment Procedure: Four Areas of 
the Law 
The 2015 revisions did not merely make structural and stylistic 
changes to Article 966. Substantive changes to the article were also made 
in multiple areas. These changes were intended to make Louisiana 
summary judgment procedure itself, not just the article, more orderly and 
streamlined.111 This Comment does not address every substantive change 
that was made, but focuses on four specific areas: timing and briefing, 
evidence and supporting documents, effects on remaining parties when a 
partial motion for summary judgment is granted, and appeals.  
1. The Elimination of District Court Rule 9.9 and Extended 
Deadlines 
Perhaps the most significant substantive changes were made to the 
timing and briefing deadlines in the article. Before the 2015 revisions, 
Article 966 relied on District Court Rule 9.9 (“Rule 9.9”) to set the 
timeline for filing motions for summary judgment, opposition briefs, reply 
memoranda, and other supporting documents.112 Rule 9.9 requires a party 
who files a motion or opposition “[to] furnish the trial judge and serve on 
all other parties a supporting memorandum that cites both the relevant 
facts and applicable law.”113 This memorandum must be served on the 
parties so that it is received at least 15 calendar days before the hearing.114 
The party opposing the motion is required to furnish the trial judge and 
serve on the moving party his or her opposition memorandum at least eight 
calendar days before the hearing.115 Finally, the moving party may file a 
reply to the opposition memorandum, which must be furnished to the 
judge and served on the opposing party before 4:00 p.m. on the last day 
that allows one full working day in advance of the hearing.116 In all 
instances, the rule makes it clear that the court can set shorter deadlines, 
but does not expressly provide for extension of deadlines.117  
                                                                                                             
 111. See Price, supra note 8. See also The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 27:30. 
 112. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(B)(1) (2015) (“The motion for summary 
judgment, memorandum in support thereof, and supporting affidavits shall be 
served within the time limits provided by District Court Rule 9.9.”). 
 113. LA. DIST. CT. R. 9.9(b). 
 114. Id. 
 115. LA. DIST. CT. R. 9.9(c). 
 116. For example, if the hearing was set for a Monday, the reply memorandum 
must have been filed by 4:00 p.m. on Thursday. LA. DIST. CT. R. 9.9(d). 
 117. LA. DIST. CT. R. 9.9(b), (c). 
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Courts have long interpreted the language of Rule 9.9 as “mandatory 
and substantive.”118 As a result, parties who file late may waive their 
opportunity to orally argue their case, may be required to pay attorney’s fees, 
or—more importantly—may be considered not to have filed the motion or 
supporting documents at all.119 Because summary judgment motions are 
often dispositive of entire causes of action, the stakes are much higher for 
missing a filing deadline on a motion for summary judgment than most other 
pre-trial motions, such as motions to compel discovery.120 Practitioners and 
the revision subcommittee were concerned that the consequences of missing 
a filing deadline under Rule 9.9 were inappropriate for summary judgment 
motions because of these high stakes.121 This concern is amplified further 
when considered in conjunction with the “magnitude of evidence now 
required for [summary judgment] motions and oppositions.”122  
Another factor cited by members of the subcommittee as compelling 
revisions in this area was concerns about parties using unscrupulous 
motions practice to gain an unfair advantage for their clients.123 Because 
the law did not impose a deadline to file a motion for summary judgment, 
a moving party could postpone making his or her motion until the last day 
possible, taking great care to ensure that it was well-written, 
comprehensive, and legally sound.124 The opposing party, on the other 
hand, would have a comparatively short timeline in which to respond with 
an opposition memoranda.125 This last-minute filing also worked against 
                                                                                                             
 118. See, e.g., Guillory v. Chapman, 38 So. 3d 573, 575–76 (La. Ct. App. 
2010) rev’d 44 So. 3d 272 (La. 2010); Buggage v. Volks Constructors, 928 So. 
2d 536 (La. 2006) (“The time limitation established by La. C.C.P. art. 966(B) for 
the serving of affidavits in opposition to the motion for summary judgment is 
mandatory; affidavits not timely filed can be ruled inadmissible and properly 
excluded by the trial court.”); Gisclair v. Bonneval, 928 So. 2d 39 (La. Ct. App. 
2005) (holding that because evidence was untimely submitted, the trial court was 
legally correct in refusing to consider the evidence); Price, supra note 8, at 7. 
 119. Price, supra note 8, at 6. See also Newsome v. Homer Memorial Med. 
Ctr., 32 So. 3d 800 (La. 2010); Guillory, 44 So. 3d 272 (2010); Mor-Tem Risk 
Mgmt. Serv., Inc., v. Shore, 978 So. 2d 588 (La. Ct. App. 2008); but see Sims v. 
Hawkins-Sheppard, 65 So. 3d 588 (La. Ct. App. 2008). 
 120. The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 29:00. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Price, supra note 8, at 6. 
 123. The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 29:48. 
 124. Under Article 966 as it read prior to 2015, a plaintiff could move for 
summary judgment “any time after the answer has been filed” and the defendant 
could move for summary judgment “at any time.” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 
966(A)(1) (2014).  
 125. The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 30:00. 
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the purpose of summary judgment. While the moving party waits to file, 
the other parties are working towards preparing for trial. If the motion for 
summary judgment is then granted, terminating the litigation, the time and 
resources invested into trial preparation are wasted.126 Further, if the trial 
court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is taken up on a 
supervisory writ,127 late filed motions risk substantially increasing the delay, 
as the trial court proceeding will be stayed to allow the appellate court time 
to issue a ruling.128  
The 2015 revisions eliminated the references to Rule 9.9 and instead set 
out deadlines directly in Article 966. These deadlines significantly change 
the timeline for making, opposing, and ruling on summary judgment. Now, 
a motion for summary judgment and all supporting documents must be 
served on all parties not less than 65 days in advance of the trial date.129 Any 
opposition to the motion, and all documents in support of the motion, must 
be filed no less than 15 days before the hearing on the motion.130 This 
deadline is a significant extension from Rule 9.9, which requires filing no 
less than eight days prior to the hearing.131 Any reply memoranda must be 
served and filed not less than five days before the hearing, which is another 
significant extension from the mere one day prior to the hearing required 
by Rule 9.9.132 Finally, the revisions require that the hearing be set not less 
than 30 days after the filing of the motion and not less than 30 days in 
advance of the trial date, and courts are required to render judgment on the 
motion not less than 20 days prior to trial.133 In contrast, prior to the 2015 
revisions, the trial court could rule on a motion for summary judgment at 
“a reasonable time,” but no less than ten days prior to the trial.134 After the 
2015 revisions, courts are given express permission to extend filing and 
                                                                                                             
 126. Id. at 30:50. 
 127. In Louisiana, appellate courts can exercise their supervisory jurisdiction 
over trial courts by granting a supervisory writ to review interlocutory judgments. 
Raymond P. Ward, A Writ in Time, 51 LA. B.J. 338, 338−39 (2004). Interlocutory 
judgments are those that do not determine the merits, but only preliminary matters 
in the course of an action. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1841 (2015). 
 128. The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 30:50. 
 129. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(B)(1) (2016). 
 130. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(B)(2) (2016). 
 131. LA. DIST. CT. Rule 9.9(c). 
 132. LA. DIST. CT. Rule 9.9(d). 
 133. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(C) (2016). 
 134. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(D) (2015). 
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briefing deadlines if necessary and agreed to by all the parties.135 The 
courts are also prohibited from shortening the deadlines.136 
2. Introducing and Objecting to Evidence  
The 2015 revisions also addressed the manner for determining proper 
evidence associated with motions for summary judgment.137 Since the 
article’s introduction into the Code of Civil Procedure, the means for 
introducing and objecting to evidence in conjunction with a motion for 
summary judgment have been inconsistent and confusing.138 These 
concerns led to significant changes in Article 966’s provisions governing 
evidence.  
a. Documents “On File” or “Deemed Admitted”: Confusing 
Language and the Necessity of Revision 
Before 2012, evidence supporting a motion for summary judgment 
could be considered if it was placed “on file” by the parties.139 Though this 
rule appears relatively simple, it proved too vague in practice. Louisiana 
courts diverged on the correct interpretation of the phrase “on file.”140 
Some circuits, including the First Circuit, interpreted the provision more 
loosely, allowing evidence that was not previously on file to be introduced 
at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.141 That court held that 
“as an alternative to filing, any documents could be considered by the trial 
court if offered and accepted into evidence at the hearing on the motion, 
even if previously not ‘on file.’”142 The Third Circuit, on the other hand, 
                                                                                                             
 135. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(B) (2016). 
 136. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 cmt. d (2016). 
 137. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(A), (F) (2016). 
 138. William R. Forrester, Jr., 2013 Changes to Code of Civil Procedure: 
Recent Amendments Create Evidentiary Traps for the Unwary, 61 LA. B.J. 98, 99 
(2013). 
 139. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(B) (2011) (“The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file . . . show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that 
the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”); see also Forrester, supra 
note 138, at 99. 
 140. Compare Mapp Constr., L.L.C. v. Southgate Penthouses, L.L.C., 29 So. 
3d 548 (La. Ct. App. 2009), with Ultra Pure Water Techs. Inc. v. Standex Int’l 
Corp., 89 So. 3d 1282 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 141. Mapp Constr., L.L.C., 29 So. 3d at 563. 
 142. Forrester, supra note 138, at 99 (citing Mapp Constr., L.L.C., 29 So. 3d 
at 563). 
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did not allow evidence to be introduced at the hearing.143 That court would 
reverse a motion for summary judgment if evidence that was not 
previously on file was introduced at the hearing.144  
In an attempt to correct this problem, the legislature amended Article 
966 in 2012, removing the “on file” language and adding a requirement in 
Paragraph (E) that evidence had to be “admitted” in support of the 
motion.145 Although this change may have eliminated the concerns arising 
from the “on file” language, the new language created new interpretive 
problems. The admission requirement was interpreted in some cases to 
mandate a formal admission by court ruling at the hearing on the motion.146 
Other courts continued to allow evidence to be introduced before the 
hearing.147 Introducing evidence at the hearing can be problematic for a 
few reasons. First, the opposing party could be surprised by evidence at 
the hearing and not prepared to counter because the evidence was not on 
file or referenced in the motion.148 Additionally, requiring formal 
admission at the hearing could create a risk that the formality of admitting 
and memorializing the admission of each document on the court record 
would be overlooked.149 This requirement would encourage appellate 
courts to reverse otherwise properly granted motions for summary 
judgment for lack of evidence properly admitted into the record and not 
because the motion was improperly granted.150 
The legislature again attempted to clarify these provisions in 2013, 
adding language that stated “evidence cited in and attached to the motion 
for summary judgment or memorandum filed by an adverse party is 
deemed admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment.”151 
This change appeared to eliminate the need for formal admission into the 
                                                                                                             
 143. Ultra Pure Water Techs., Inc., 89 So. 3d at 1288–89. 
 144. Forrester, supra note 138, at 99. See, e.g., Ultra Pure Water Techs., Inc., 
89 So. 3d at 1288. 
 145. 2012 La. Acts 1697 (codified at LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(E)(2) 
(2013)); Forrester, supra note 138, at 99. 
 146. Marengo v. Harding, 118 So. 3d 1200, 1202 (La. Ct. App. 2013) 
(interpreting the 2012 amendment to mean that “only evidence formally admitted 
into evidence during the summary judgment hearing can be considered by the trial 
court.”); see also Cook v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd., 123 So. 3d 731 (La. Ct. App. 
2013). 
 147. Ultra Pure Water Techs., Inc., 89 So. 3d at 1288; Forrester, 61 LA. B.J. 
at 99. 
 148. The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 26:32. 
 149. Forrester, supra note 138, at 99. 
 150. Id. 
 151. 2013 La. Acts 2258 (codified at LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(F)(2) 
(2014) (emphasis added). 
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record at a hearing. However, the addition of this provision created yet 
another issue: the potential that by deeming the attachments “admitted,” 
courts would simply admit evidence without actually considering its 
admissibility at trial.152 This improper admission of evidence could result 
in cases being terminated by granted motions for summary judgment based 
on evidence that would not have been admissible at trial, despite the fact 
that evidence submitted in support of or opposition to motions for 
summary judgment must be admissible at trial.153  
Though the article was amended again in 2014, no changes were made 
to the provisions that governed admitting evidence.154 As a result, the 
problems created by the 2013 amendments still existed.155 However, some 
jurisprudence appears to indicate that in practice, courts began to move 
away from requiring formal introduction into evidence.156 Thus, simply 
citing the document in the motion or memorandum and attaching the 
document was sufficient.157 However, a problem existed because 
“extraneous” documents were placed on file and were “deemed admitted,” 
influencing the trial court’s decision on the motion, even though those 
documents would not be admissible at trial.158 Further, some disparity in 
practice still existed across the state courts with regard to what would be 
admitted and how. 
b. The 2015 Revisions 
The subcommittee addressed the problems with evidentiary procedure 
in multiple places in Article 966 with the 2015 revisions. First, the list of 
the types of documents that can be submitted in support of or in opposition 
to motions for summary judgment was expanded to include certified 
medical records, written stipulations, and memoranda.159 These documents 
                                                                                                             
 152. The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 26:42. 
 153. See BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 58, § 8:6, at 220 (“It is clear that the 
evidence submitted by the parties to support or oppose a motion for summary 
judgment must be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.”). This 
principle is supported by a significant amount of case law. Id. at n.3. 
 154. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(F)(2) (2014). 
 155. See First Bank & Trust v. Proctor’s Cove II, L.L.C., 150 So. 3d 418, 428 
(La. Ct. App. 2014); see also Martinez v. Jefferson Parish Sch., 166 So. 3d 273 
(La. Ct. App. 2014). 
 156. Ventura v. McCune, 184 So. 3d 46 (2014); Mason v. T & M Boat Rentals, 
L.L.C., 137 So. 3d 741, 743–44 (La. Ct. App. 2014). 
 157. Id.  
 158. The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 25:50. See also First Bank & Trust, 150 
So. 3d at 428; Martinez, 166 So. 3d 273. 
 159. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(A)(4) (2016). 
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are in addition to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions that were previously included in the list.160 
The revisions also clarified that this list of documents is “exclusive,” 
which means that if the type of document is not on the list, it is not 
admissible.161 However, the 2015 revision comments indicate that other 
documentary evidence can be filed if it is “properly authenticated by an 
affidavit or deposition to which they are attached,” or in other words, if 
the evidence would be admissible at trial, it can be filed.162  
Second, the revision combined former Paragraphs (F)(2) and (3) into 
new Paragraph (D)(2) to address the confusion that previously existed 
regarding the process by which evidence could be brought before the court 
for consideration on a motion for summary judgment. Previously, 
Paragraph (F) read as follows:  
(2) Evidence cited in and attached to the motion for summary 
judgment or memorandum filed by an adverse party is deemed 
admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment unless 
excluded in response to an objection made in accordance with 
Subparagraph (3) of this Paragraph. . . . (3) Objections to evidence 
in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
may be raised in a memorandum or motion to strike stating the 
specific grounds therefor.163 
The language governing the admission of evidence in conjunction with 
motions for summary judgment now simply states:  
The court may consider only those documents filed in support of 
or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and shall 
consider any documents to which no objection is made. Any 
objection to a document shall be raised in a timely filed opposition 
or reply memorandum.164  
The 2015 revisions removed the “deemed admitted” language that was 
previously problematic and replaced it with a requirement that any 
                                                                                                             
 160. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(B)(2) (2015). 
 161. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 cmt. c (2016); see also The Legal Ease, 
supra note 9, at 23:50. 
 162. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 cmt. c (2016). Other documentary evidence 
was listed as “photographs, pictures, video images, or contracts” and “an opinion 
of the medical review panel.” Id.  
 163. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(F)(2), (3) (2015) (emphasis added). 
 164. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(D)(2) (2016) (emphasis added). 
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document to be considered by the court must be filed with the motion or 
opposition to the motion.165 
Finally, the process for objecting to evidence submitted in conjunction 
with motions for summary judgment was significantly altered by the 
revisions. Previously, a party could object to evidence via a written motion 
to strike or in writing via the opposition or reply memorandum.166 
Problems arose from the use of the motion to strike because an additional 
hearing would have to be held on that motion, and that motion would also 
be subject to the deadlines set out in Rule 9.9.167 These rules led to 
unnecessary delay and would postpone the hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment until the evidentiary issues were resolved.168  
The 2015 revisions eliminated motions to strike and oral objections.169 
Now, objections must be made in either the opposition memorandum or 
the moving party’s reply, both of which must be timely filed.170 Failure to 
make these written objections will result in the party waiving his or her 
right to object.171 The elimination of the motion to strike was intended to 
streamline the process.172 It remedies problems with delay arising from the 
need to hold an additional hearing on the motion and allows time for 
opposition and reply memoranda regarding the motion to strike under Rule 
9.9. The prohibition on oral objections was logical, as the 2015 revisions 
appear to prohibit the introduction of new evidence at the hearing on the 
motion for summary judgment.173 After an objection is raised in writing, 
the court is now explicitly required to consider all objections before 
rendering judgment, and the court also must state on the record or in 
written reasons what evidence was found inadmissible or was not 
                                                                                                             
 165. Id. 
 166. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(F)(3) (2015). 
 167. The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 40:00; LA. DIST. CT. R. 9.9. 
 168. See The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 40:24. 
 169. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(D)(2) (2016); see also LA. CODE CIV. 
PROC. art. 966 cmt. k (2016). 
 170. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(D)(2) (2016).  
 171. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(D)(2) (2016). 
 172. The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 38:32. 
 173. The revisions tend to indicate a prohibition on new evidence at the 
hearing when the provisions are read together. “Subparagraph (D)(2) makes clear 
that the court can consider only those documents filed in support of or in 
opposition to the motion” and “an oral objection to any document cannot be raised 
at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment . . . .” Further, all documents 
must be filed no less than five days before the hearing on the motion and no 
additional documents may be filed after the opposition memorandum is filed. See 
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(D)(2) cmt. k (2016); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 
966(B)(1)−(3) (2016). 
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considered by the court.174 If no objection is raised, the court must consider 
all the evidence submitted, regardless of whether that evidence would be 
admissible at trial.175 
3. Paragraph (G) and the Effect of Granting Partial Motions for 
Summary Judgment  
Another important change to Article 966 was the redrafting of 
Paragraph (G), which addressed the effects of a granted partial motion for 
summary judgment on remaining parties to a case.176 Prior to 2015, when 
a partial motion for summary judgment was granted and one of multiple 
defendants was found not at fault or not liable, that party was not to be 
considered later in any allocation of fault or placed on the jury verdict 
form.177 However, there was an exception for summary judgments granted 
solely because of a successful assertion of an affirmative defense.178 To 
further complicate the matter, the affirmative defense exception did not 
apply in cases where the affirmative defense involved an assertion of 
negligence or fault of the plaintiff.179 Additionally, in order for Paragraph 
(G) to apply, the trial court judge had to explicitly specify its applicability 
in the judgment.180  
The requirement that the trial court specifically state in the judgment 
that Paragraph (G) applied created a risk that merely because of judicial 
oversight or an incorrect omission, parties who were dismissed from the 
case would be considered in the allocation of fault or placed on the jury 
verdict form.181 When the court failed to specify that Paragraph (G) 
applied, defense counsel could continue to present to the jury a theory of 
third-party fault that ought to have been eliminated by the granted motion 
for summary judgment.182 In addition to concerns caused by the procedural 
                                                                                                             
 174. Price, supra note 8, at 7. 
 175. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(D)(2) (2015). 
 176. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (2015). For an interpretation of 
Paragraph (G) as it read prior to the 2015 revisions, see Barrilleaux v. Bd. of 
Supervisors of La. State Univ., 170 So. 3d 1015, 1019–21 (La. Ct. App. 2015). 
 177. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G)(1) (2014). 
 178. Id. Affirmative defenses can be found in LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art 1005 
(listing “negligence, or fault of the plaintiff and others, duress, error or mistake, 
estoppel, extinguishment of the obligation in any manner, failure of consideration, 
fraud, illegality injury by fellow servant, and any other matter constituting an 
affirmative defense” as affirmative defenses applicable under Paragraph (G)). 
 179. Id.  
 180. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G)(2) (2014). 
 181. The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 50:22. 
 182. Id. at 50:35. 
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requirements of the paragraph, the language of the paragraph was 
cumbersome and confusing.183 It was unclear to both courts and parties 
when the paragraph applied, especially given the affirmative defense 
exception and the exceptions to that exception. To address this problem, 
the 2015 revisions eliminated the affirmative defense exception entirely, 
as well as the requirement that the trial court explicitly specify in the 
judgment when Paragraph (G) applied.184 
4. Entirely New Law: The Addition of Paragraph (H) and its Effect 
on Appeals 
Before 2015, if a motion for summary judgment was denied, a 
supervisory writ could be taken to a court of appeal, and if the court of 
appeal reversed, granting summary judgment, the case would terminate.185 
Often, the parties would not have had a chance to argue their case in front 
of the court that ultimately granted the motion for summary judgment.186 
This scenario was particularly problematic for practitioners whose clients 
would believe they had won their case—and sometimes even twice—only 
to then have the case terminated by summary judgment on a writ.187 This 
fostered a perception of unfairness in the system and deprived the parties 
of their day in court, which is an overarching concern with the motion for 
summary judgment process.188 
To address this concern, the 2015 revisions added an entirely new 
paragraph to Article 966.189 The addition of Paragraph (H) requires appellate 
                                                                                                             
 183. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G)(1) (2016). 
 184. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(G) (2016). 
 185. The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 53:46. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 54:30. For example, often defendants filed motions for summary 
judgment that were denied by the trial court. Defendants then took writs to the 
appellate court, where the writ was denied without reasons. As a result, the 
plaintiff would believe they had defeated the motion twice. Frequently though, 
defendants took writs to the Louisiana Supreme Court on the appellate court’s 
ruling. The Supreme Court did not rule on the writs immediately and without 
much notice, the Supreme Court would grant the writ, reverse the lower courts’ 
denials of the motion, and summarily dismiss the case, thereby completely 
changing the outcome with little to no notice to the parties. Id. at 54:10. 
 188. See discussion supra Part I.C; see also Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 
305, 307 (5th Cir. 1940); Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568, 571 
(10th Cir. 1946); Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1320 
(2d Cir. 1975); see generally Thomas, supra note 32.  
 189. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(H) (2016) (“On review, an appellate court 
shall not reverse a trial court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment and grant 
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courts to assign a case for briefing and to permit the parties to request oral 
argument in the event that the court considers reversing a lower court and 
granting a motion for summary judgment.190 This addition was intended to 
foster fairness by leveling the playing field and to ensure that parties get a 
chance to argue their case in court.191 Members of the subcommittee also 
expressed a desire to treat supervisory writs dealing with motions for 
summary judgment more like true appeals.192 Because of the high stakes 
associated with the grant of a motion for summary judgment,193 courts 
should take great care to ensure that granting a motion for summary 
judgment is appropriate. Access to briefs written by the parties and oral 
argument when requested will help the appellate court better understand 
the case at hand and better equip the court to reach a proper result in the 
case. 
C. What the Revisions Did Not Change: Burdens of Proof and 
Production 
Although the 2015 revisions brought about a number changes to the 
substantive law of Article 966, the legal standard for summary judgment 
did not change with the 2015 revisions. To prevail on a motion for 
summary judgment, the moving party is still required to show that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.194 The technicalities of the burdens of proof and 
production also did not change.195 The revision comments—though not 
substantive law—indicate that the purpose of the changes made to the 
paragraphs dealing with the burden of proof was merely to clarify and 
make explicit the existing burden of proof.196 The revision comments also 
state that the provisions are meant to be consistent with the 1997 revisions 
                                                                                                             
a summary judgment dismissing a case or a party without assigning the case for 
briefing and permitting the parties an opportunity to request oral argument.”). 
 190. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(H) (2015). 
 191. The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 57:00. 
 192. Id. at 57:39. “True appeal” refers to an appeal taken from a final judgment 
of the trial court and are generally accompanied by extensive briefing and oral 
argument, as opposed to supervisory writs, which are taken from interlocutory 
judgments and are generally not accompanied by briefs or oral arguments. See 
supra note 127 and accompanying text; The Legal Ease, supra note 9, at 1:01:07. 
 193. Id. 
 194. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (A)(3) (2016); see discussion supra Part I.A. 
 195. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (D)(1) (2016). 
 196. Price, supra note 8, at 7; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 cmt. j (2016). 
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that overruled all cases inconsistent with Hayes v. Autin.197 Therefore, the 
mover still carries the burden of production.198 If the mover will not bear 
the burden of proof on the issue at trial, the mover must only demonstrate 
a lack of support for the opposing party’s claim or defense.199 The non-
moving party still carries the burden to establish the existence of a genuine 
issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, and the facts are still viewed in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party.200 The fact that the underlying legal standards 
governing motions for summary judgment remain unchanged is important 
to determining the effectiveness and success of the 2015 revisions and 
whether the legislature achieved its goals. 
III. MISSION ACCOMPLISHED? EVALUATING THE SUCCESS 
OF THE 2015 REVISIONS TO ARTICLE 966 
Although the fundamentals of summary judgment motion practice and 
Article 966 remain unchanged, the 2015 revisions did bring many positive 
changes to Louisiana’s summary judgment procedure. The changes 
effectively simplified and modernized the language and format of the 
article while correcting the piecemeal nature of the article created by 
frequent past revisions.201 The revisions also successfully addressed some 
of the practical problems that judges and lawyers experienced surrounding 
summary judgment procedure prior to 2015.202 Importantly, the changes 
were made without requiring potentially disruptive substantive changes to 
well-settled law involving a widely used procedural motion.203 The 
revisions changed how summary judgment works in practice, while also 
trying to avoid exacerbating existing problems or creating new ones. 
Though the revisions were largely successful in this regard, there is still 
some concern that certain problems that existed prior to 2015 were not 
adequately addressed. 
A. Extended Deadlines: Balancing Needs with Increased Delay 
The extension of the timing and briefing deadlines successfully 
addressed the revision subcommittee’s concern that the filing deadlines 
                                                                                                             
 197. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 cmt. j (2016); see also supra Part I.C.  
 198. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966(D)(1) (2016). 
 199. Id. 
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 201. See supra Parts I.D, II.A. 
 202. See supra Part II.B. 
 203. See supra Part II.C. 
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were much too short.204 Given the severity of potential consequences for 
missing a deadline to file a motion for summary judgment and the amount 
of evidence and briefing that is now common with the motions, a longer 
period for filing was necessary.205 The extension of the deadlines helps to 
ensure that parties moving for summary judgment will have adequate time 
to craft a well-framed motion and that the opposing party will not be 
caught unprepared or with inadequate time to respond in opposition to the 
motion.206 Further, the extensions also help to ensure that the trial court 
judge has adequate time to rule on the motion without disrupting the trial 
process. By clarifying that the court and the parties involved may lengthen 
the filing and briefing deadlines when necessary, and prohibiting courts 
from shortening deadlines, parties are now afforded much more flexibility 
in case management.207 Further, extending the deadlines counteracts 
parties who would potentially use unscrupulous practices to unfairly 
disadvantage the opposing party.208 
Although the revisions to the timing and briefing deadlines help 
correct the previous problems, the lengthening of the deadlines might still 
cause significant delay. As a result of this delay, summary judgment will 
likely continue to absorb more time and more resources, and it will become 
even farther removed from the quick means to dispose of cases prior to 
trial that it was intended to be. This potential consequence is particularly 
relevant when combined with the changes made to evidentiary procedure 
and the appeals process, as those changes might also exacerbate the 
delay.209 
B. Admitting Inadmissible Evidence: Changes to Evidentiary Procedure 
Remedy Problems, but Require Caution 
The changes to evidentiary procedure help to resolve the practical 
problems that existed prior to 2015 and prevent problems that have arisen 
with a similar rule at the federal level. The evidentiary guidance set forth 
in the Federal Rules illustrates this point.210 Federal Rule 56 permits 
federal courts to consider “materials in the record, including depositions, 
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, 
                                                                                                             
 204. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 205. Price, supra note 8, at 6. 
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stipulations (including those made for the purposes of the motion only), 
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.”211 This list is 
expansive, prompting some commentators writing on the Federal Rules to 
reason that this list has led to increasing delay and confusion as more evidence 
is submitted in conjunction with a motion for summary judgment—with more 
evidence, courts must necessarily spend more time reviewing what is 
submitted.212 
The 2015 revisions avoid the problem experienced in federal courts by 
explicitly prohibiting Louisiana courts from considering anything in the 
record other than the documents filed in support of or in opposition to the 
motion and by restricting the admissible documents to the exclusive list in 
Article 966.213 Though it may seem counterintuitive that the 2015 revisions 
first expanded the list of permitted documents before restricting the 
admissible documents to those explicitly listed, this change in fact addresses 
multiple problems at once. The expanded but exclusive list makes it clear to 
practitioners what types of evidence are not admissible, thus limiting the filing 
of extraneous documents.214 The list also makes it clear when objections 
should be made and eliminates the need to sort through a huge number of 
supporting documents to find which ones are admissible,215 because now 
certain documents are clearly permitted and other types of evidence are 
admissible only when properly authenticated.216 Importantly, however, the 
court must consider all documents to which no party objects.217 As a result of 
this caveat, poor lawyering or mere oversight could cause the court to consider 
evidence that is not proper evidence and that would not be admissible at 
trial.218 
The 2015 revisions also addressed the problems arising from evidence 
being “deemed admitted” when it was cited in and attached to a motion 
                                                                                                             
 211. Id. 
 212. See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, Summary Judgment and the Law of Unintended 
Consequences, 36 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 231, 241–42 (2011); Boron, supra note 
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 216. LA. CODE CIV. PROC, art. 966(A)(4) (2016); see also LA. CODE CIV. 
PROC. art. 966 cmt. c (2016). 
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for summary judgment.219 According to comments from members of the 
subcommittee, to bring evidence before the court, it now must be filed with 
the motion for summary judgment.220 No consideration of the admissibility 
of the evidence will occur unless a party objects to the evidence.221 
Although removing the unclear “deemed admitted” language will remedy 
the problems that arose from it, the problem with improper evidence being 
considered on motions for summary judgment still exists. Before 2015, 
improper evidence would be “deemed admitted” if it was merely cited in 
and attached to a motion for summary judgment.222 Now, however, 
improper evidence can be admitted simply because a lawyer does not 
object. This risk means that summary judgment motions could be decided 
on evidence that would not be admissible at trial—and this scenario is 
problematic given the high stakes attached to summary judgment motions, 
a concern acknowledged by the revision committee.223 
Finally, by eliminating the motion to strike, the revisions help 
streamline the summary judgment process and combat concerns about 
delay. Hearings on motions to strike will no longer occur in summary 
judgment proceedings and will ideally speed up the summary judgment 
process.224 Requiring any evidentiary objections to be made in writing and 
included in a memorandum and requiring the trial court to provide reasons 
for their rulings on the objections help to create a clearer record for 
appeals. Logically, a clear record will help appellate courts make better 
determinations as to whether the trial court’s grant or denial of the motion 
was proper and allow practitioners to understand why certain evidence was 
not admitted, providing resources for future cases in which similar 
situations may arise. 
C. Paragraph (G) and the Law of the Case: Simple Changes Create 
Clarity 
The changes made to Paragraph (G)225 mean that now when a party is 
dismissed from a suit on a motion for summary judgment, the party’s 
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dismissal becomes the law of the case—binding the parties by operation 
of law.226 The judge is not required to state that Paragraph (G) applies and 
there are no exceptions to its applicability.227 These small changes remedy 
a great deal of confusion with regard to the paragraph’s applicability.228 
The changes to Paragraph (G) also affect parties relying on theories of 
third-party liability as a defense.229 The revisions make it clear that when 
a party is found not negligent or not at fault through a motion for summary 
judgment, that party cannot be mentioned at trial or placed on the jury 
verdict form to be considered in the ultimate allocation of fault.230 As a 
result, defendants who wish to rely on a theory of third-party liability will 
be motivated to defend against the motion that would eliminate the third 
party.231  
D. Appellate Procedure: Benefits of the New Law Will Outweigh the 
Burden of Delay 
The addition of Paragraph (H), which created a new procedure for the 
review of motions for summary judgment by appellate courts, was 
described as “perhaps the most controversial” portion of the 2015 
revisions by members of the subcommittee.232 The addition of this 
paragraph, which requires appellate courts to assign summary judgment 
appeals for briefing,233 will greatly benefit practitioners and parties 
involved in litigation, particularly when a motion for summary judgment 
is denied, appealed, and subsequently granted by an appellate court. When 
the parties are notified that briefs are to be submitted, they are effectively 
put on notice that their case is going to be considered by the appellate 
court.234 Even more importantly, the brief request puts the party who won 
the summary judgment motion at the trial court level on notice that the 
case is potentially going to be dismissed via a granted summary judgment 
motion.235 These circumstances encourage settlement negotiations and 
out-of-court resolution, which helps to further the purpose of summary 
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judgment–the expeditious disposition of cases.236 Additionally, permitting 
the parties to request oral argument counteracts the concern that summary 
judgment deprives parties of their day in court by giving them an 
opportunity to argue their case before the appellate court. The oral 
argument provision, combined with the now-required briefing, will help 
the appellate court to make a better, more informed decision regarding 
whether to grant the motion for summary judgment.237  
Though the changed requirements for appeals are likely to cause some 
additional delay, particularly if the parties request oral argument, the 
benefits will outweigh the potential downsides. Treating motions for 
summary judgment before appellate courts more like true appeals—rather 
than normal supervisory writs238—will help to ensure the proper 
disposition of cases on motions for summary judgment. This result is 
particularly important given the high stakes attached to a granted motion 
for summary judgment.239 
IV. MOVING FORWARD WITH MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The 2015 revisions were largely successful in achieving the goals set 
out by the Law Institute and the subcommittee. However, judges and 
practitioners ought to keep in mind a few important considerations when 
working with the new Article 966. First, the extension of the timing and 
briefing deadlines increases the possibility of delay,240 especially when 
combined with the new required briefing and the potential for oral argument 
at the appellate level.241 Though this increased possibility for delay does run 
counter to the true purpose of motions for summary judgment, the benefits 
of these changes will likely outweigh the potential downsides. Regardless 
of these benefits, courts and practitioners should not needlessly delay the 
summary judgment. Courts ought to resist the urge to grant extensions 
unless an extension is absolutely necessary. Similarly, lawyers ought to 
avoid requesting extensions when possible, especially now that the 
deadlines provided by the revisions are more generous.242  
Second, concerns still remain regarding summary judgment evidentiary 
procedure and the possibility that otherwise inadmissible evidence can be 
considered by the trial court on motions for summary judgment, even after 
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the 2015 revisions.243 Because no consideration of the admissibility of 
evidence is required to occur if no objections are made regarding that 
evidence, poor lawyering or even mere oversight could allow inadmissible 
evidence to be considered. This scenario can result in a motion for summary 
judgment being decided on improper evidence, which is particularly 
important in light of the high stakes. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
Comment to propose a formal solution to this problem, practitioners ought to 
take great care to ensure that they are objecting to any potentially inadmissible 
evidence in their memoranda and that they are attentive to the admissibility of 
the evidence that they are submitting in conjunction with the motion. 
To further combat issues with delay, it may also be beneficial for 
Louisiana courts to consider adopting rules that incorporate summary 
judgment more thoroughly into pre-trial planning. Courts could incorporate 
motions for summary judgment into case management orders and discovery 
planning and even hold special pre-motion conferences.244 These conferences, 
particularly in complex cases, would allow the parties to discuss and 
streamline issues to be raised in the motion. These conferences in turn would 
reduce the amount of briefing necessary, thereby reducing both delay and the 
costs of filing the motion, simply because of increased communication 
between the court and the parties.245 Some individual judges at the federal 
level already require similar conferences, and the use of these conferences has 
been met with some success.246 Further, courts can include these conferences 
in their own local procedural rules, given that the local rules remain in line 
with the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure. This incorporation 
would allow additional changes to summary judgment procedure to occur on 
a case-by-case basis, without requiring further revision to Article 966. 
Minimizing the need to repeatedly revise the article makes it possible to reap 
the full benefits of the revisions without returning to the disorganized state 
of the article prior to the 2015 revisions. 
CONCLUSION 
The comprehensive 2015 revisions to Louisiana Code of Civil 
Procedure Article 966 governing motions for summary judgment made 
numerous changes to both the structure and substance of the article. 
Structurally, the article was reorganized, correcting for the repeated 
piecemeal revisions of the past 20 years and creating a logical flow through 
the article. The substantive changes include significant extensions of the 
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timing and briefing deadlines, expansion of the exclusive list of documents 
that can be submitted as evidence, streamlining the process for objecting to 
evidence, clarifying the provisions of Paragraph (G), and adding an entirely 
new provision governing appellate procedure. These changes successfully 
addressed the practical problems that existed in Louisiana summary judgment 
procedure and helped to make the process as a whole more logical and orderly. 
Though some concerns still remain, particularly regarding delay and the 
consideration of potentially inadmissible evidence, the benefits of the 2015 
revisions largely outweigh these downsides. Further, the effects of these 
downsides can be mitigated to the extent that lawyers and judges keep the true 
purpose of motions for summary judgment in mind and seek to act efficiently 
within the bounds of the new Article 966. 
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